Jennifer M. Pacella is an Assistant Professor of Law in the Zicklin School of Business. Her scholarship examines the ever-growing phenomenon of whistleblowing and the laws surrounding it, including retaliation protections and bounty reward structures for whistleblowers under various federal laws, specifically in the securities and corporate law context, and the intersection of these issues with compliance, corporate governance, risk management, and business ethics. Professor Pacella has published several articles on these topics in such journals as the Yale Journal on Regulation, Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law as part of an invited symposium, Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, and Temple Law Review. She regularly presents her research at academic conferences across the country and has offered commentary as a subject matter expert in whistleblowing law to various media outlets. She teaches in the field of compliance, whistleblowing, business organizations, and the fundamentals of business law. Professor Pacella is a member of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business, a peer reviewer for the American Business Law Journal, and an officer of the Mid-Atlantic Academy of Legal Studies in Business. Prior to joining the faculty of the Zicklin School of Business, Professor Pacella served as a law clerk to the Honorable Julio M. Fuentes of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and also practiced securities and commercial law for several years in Shearman & Sterling LLP’s New York office.
Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections for Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 Yale Journal on Regulation 491 (2016).
The Cybersecurity Threat: Compliance and the Role of Whistleblowers, Invited Symposium: “The Role of Technology in Compliance in Financial Services: An Indispensable Tool as well as a Threat?” 11 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law 39, (2016).
Advocate or Adversary? When Attorneys Act as Whistleblowers, 28 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 1027 (2015).
Bounties for Bad Behavior: Rewarding Culpable Whistleblowers under the Dodd-Frank Act and Internal Revenue Code, 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 345 (2015).
Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 Temple Law Review 721 (2014).
Internal Whistleblowers: Emerging Judicial Debate for Anti-Retaliation Protections, Cayman Financial Review, Issue 36, (2014), http://www.compasscayman.com/cfr/2014/08/08/Internal-whistleblowers-/
If the Shoe of the SEC Doesn’t Fit: Self-Regulatory Organizations and Absolute Immunity, 58 Wayne Law Review 201 (2012).
Welcoming the Unwanted: Italy’s Response to the Immigration Phenomenon and European Union Involvement, 25 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 341 (2011).