A drawback of incentive compensation in top executive contracts is that it can push management toward manipulating earnings and lowering earnings quality to potentially reap higher personal gain. This study examines this issue by scrutinizing the link between executive stock options and restricted stock vesting and earnings quality in U.S. corporations from 2009 to 2018. The key findings of this analysis reveal that top executives employ accruals as a tool in recognizing profits in a discrete manner that enhances their incentive compensation for possible personal gain. To stress-test these findings, I examine this relationship over various intervals surrounding the time of vesting. The most pronounced patterns in this behavior are noted for CFOs who tend to lower accruals upon awards and vesting of stock option and restricted stock, and for CEOs and CFOs combined when the value of their equity is high, and they sold a sizable shares post-vesting of options and restricted stock. Both these patterns are consistent with the self-serving managerial hypothesis. As a corollary to this analysis, I examine the adoption of SEC Rule 10b5-1, which allows executives to appoint a broker to undertake planned stock purchases and sales at predetermined prices to reduce suspicion on insider manipulation around top executive stock trades. I utilize the employment of a Rule 10b5-1 plan as an exogenous variable on executive compensation structure to better understand the relationship between incentive compensation on earnings quality, while seeking to alleviate concerns on endogeneity. Interestingly, this incremental analysis on the adoption of a 10b5-1 plan reveals greater accruals manipulation in firms whose executives hold such plan, which prima-facie appears to go against the purpose of these plans in the first place.